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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND MISTAKES OF LAW 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined (1) whether a police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is a 
mistake of law that invalidates an investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) 
whether a failure to identify and argue a statute in an opposition to a motion to suppress 
constitutes a waiver of that argument in the motion’s hearing. 
 
Disposition 
 
 A police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is not a mistake of law that invalidates an 
investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment if there is another statute that does 
prohibit the suspected conduct. Also, a failure to include an argument in an opposition to a 
motion does not preclude a party from raising the argument for the first time before a district 
court in a hearing held prior to trial. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Deputy Wendy Jason pulled over Respondent Jarvis Cantsee for driving with a cracked 
windshield. Upon pulling him over, Deputy Jason saw that Cantsee appeared to be intoxicated. A 
subsequent blood test revealed that Cantsee’s blood alcohol levels were above the legal limit. 
Cantsee was arrested for, inter alia, felony DUI, even though Deputy Jason admitted that the sole 
reason for stopping Cantsee was the cracked windshield.  
 Cantsee filed a motion to suppress, claiming that Deputy Jason’s reason for pulling him 
over was a mistake of law that invalidated the traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, since 
Deputy Jason stated that driving with a cracked windshield violated NRS 484D.435, when the 
statute in fact does not prohibit such conduct.
2
 The State failed to argue that the traffic stop was 
justified under another statute in its opposition to the motion, and raised the argument for the 
first time at the motion’s hearing.  
 The district court granted the motion to suppress, finding that (1) the traffic stop was not 
objectively reasonable because the cited statute did not prohibit driving with a cracked 
windshield, and (2) the State had waived its argument that another statute justified the stop 
because it failed to raise this point in its opposition. The State appealed. 
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  By Sean Daly. 
2
  NRS 484D.435(1) prohibits driving a vehicle “with any sign, poster or other nontransparent material upon the 
front windshield.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 484D.435(1) (2013). 
Discussion 
 
The traffic stop was valid under the Fourth Amendment 
 
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
3
 Whether an 
investigatory traffic stop constitutes an unreasonable search is a mixed question of law and fact, 
thus a district court’s findings of historical fact are reviewed for clear error, and the legal 
consequences of those findings are reviewed de novo.
4
  
 For a traffic stop to comport with the Fourth Amendment, the State must show that the 
investigating officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity. If the traffic stop is based on a mistake of law—that is, the officer believed the 
suspected conduct was illegal even though the law does not actually prohibit it—there is no 
justification for the stop, regardless of the reasonableness of the mistake. However, the court 
identified an important distinction between a mistake of law and a mistake “as to which law 
applies,” stating that the incorrect application of a statute is not a mistake of law when the law 
does prohibit the suspected conduct.  The Court followed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United 
States v. Wallace,
5
 where an officer pulled over the defendant for having tinted windows because 
the officer believed that California law prohibited all front window tints, when the law in fact 
only prohibited window tints past a certain degree. The Ninth Circuit stated that this error was 
not a mistake of law that would invalidate the stop under the Fourth Amendment, so long as the 
officer had objective, probable cause to believe that the windows were in violation of the law. 
The Court also cited several jurisdictions that have reached similar conclusions in a footnote.  
 
The State did not waive its right to argue that NRS 484B.163(3) justified the investigatory traffic 
stop  
 
 Whether the State waived its argument is a question of law, and the Court reviews a 
district court’s legal conclusions de novo.6 The Court found that there is no “rule, statute, or 
other authority” that states that a failure to include an argument in a timely filed opposition is 
grounds for finding a waiver of that argument. The Court was also unaware of any authority that 
forbids the State from directing the district court to a controlling statute when it would “surprise 
the defendant.” Cantsee also made no showing of how the addition of the correct statute would 
prejudice him. Furthermore, even if Cantsee was unfairly surprised, the appropriate remedy 
would be a continuance, and the district court neither postponed the hearing nor requested a 
supplemental briefing.  
 
The district court did not decide whether Deputy Jason had reasonable suspicion to stop Cantsee 
 
 The Court then addressed an issue raised by Justice Cherry in his dissent, as to whether 
Deputy Jason had reasonable suspicion to stop Cantsee under the appropriate statute.
7
 The Court 
                                                 
3
  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4
  See Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 441, 187 P.3d 152, 157–58 (2008). 
5
  213 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2000). 
6
  See Nev. Gold & Casinos, Inc. v. Am. Heritage, Inc., 121 Nev. 84, 89, 110 P.3d 481, 484 (2005). 
7
  The appropriate statute with regard to the cracked windshield was NRS 484B.163(3), which states that “a vehicle 
must not be operated upon any highway unless the driver's vision through any required glass equipment is normal.” 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.163(3) (2013). 
stated that because the district court limited the scope of the evidentiary hearing on the motion to 
suppress to the issue of whether a safety hazard justified the stop, remand was necessary to 
determine whether the stop could be independently justified under NRS 484B.163. The Court 
stated that neither attorney elicited testimony from Deputy Jason about the circumstances 
surrounding Cantsee’s stop or any facts regarding her initial contact with Cantsee. Furthermore, 
the district court specifically stated in its order that after the suppression hearing, “the historical 
facts known to the deputy at the time of the traffic stop were unclear.” The Court concluded by 
stating that multiple courts have upheld stops premised on officers observing a windshield crack. 
   
Conclusion 
 
 The district court erred in concluding that Deputy Jason’s citation to the incorrect statute 
was a mistake of law that invalidated the traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. The district 
court also erred in concluding that the State had waived its argument by failing to raise it in its 
opposition to the motion. Therefore, the district court’s order was reversed, and the case was 
remanded to determine whether the traffic stop was justified under NRS 484B.163. 
 
 
 
